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Redefinition and Elaboration of an
Obligation to Pursue International
Negotiations for Solving Global
Environmental Problems in Light of the
WTO Shrimp/Turtle Compliance
Adjudication between Malaysia and the
United States
Kuei-Jung Ni*

INTRODUCTION
In contrast to two previous Tuna/Dolphin disputes1 resolved under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organization's (WTO) jurisprudence in the 1998 Shrimp/Turtle decision 2 demonstrated
its willingness to embrace common environmental concerns
based on the mandate of sustainable development. The WTO
Appellate Body acknowledged that U.S. environmental legislation banning shrimp products harvested in a manner harmful to
sea turtles may qualify for the paragraph (g) exception clause in
*Assistant Professor, Institute of Technology Law, National Chiao Tung University,
Taiwan, ROC. Ph.D in Law, University of Edinburgh; Visiting Scholar, Yale Law
School; LL.M, University of California at Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law, LL.M,
National Taiwan Ocean University, LL.B, National Taiwan University. An earlier
version of the article was presented at the Symposium on WTO, Technology and the
Environment held by the WTO Research Center, College of Law, National Taiwan
University in Taipei, Taiwan, April 5, 2003. I thank participants in the Symposium
for their comments and suggestions.
1. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report: United States-Restrictions on
Import of Tuna, DS21/R, submitted to parties Aug. 16, 1991, circulated Sept. 3, 1991
(not adopted), 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna 1]; GATT Dispute Settlement
Panel Report: United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R, circulated
June 16, 1994 (not adopted), 33 I.L.M 839 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna I1].
2. WTO Appellate Body Report: United States-Import Prohibition
of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, Oct. 12, 1998 (adopted Nov. 6, 1998),
38 I.L.M. 118, availableat http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Shrimp AB Report].
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Article XX3 of the GATT 1994. 4

The Appellate Body's decision was not a complete victory for
the United States, however. In spite of recognizing that the
U.S. trade restriction was a justified national environmental
policy, the Appellate Body found that the manner in which the
United States had applied its import ban was inconsistent with
its obligations under the WTO. 5 Specifically, the Appellate Body
found that the trade embargo did not meet the requirement in
the chapeau of Article XX6 forbidding unjustifiable or arbitrary
discrimination, mainly because the United States failed to engage in international negotiations with shrimp exporting countries in Southeast Asia before imposing the embargo. 7 Therefore, although the U.S. trade embargo on shrimp products was
considered consistent with paragraph (g), the failure of the
United States to prevail in the Shrimp case seemed to indicate
that the WTO would not accept the use of unilateral trade
measures aimed at environmental protection if they were unaccompanied by multilateral efforts directed at the same end.
The concept regarding a duty for countries to seek international negotiations is not new. The Appellate Body incorporated
this mandate into the Shrimp case by equating the failure of the
United States to pursue negotiations with Asian nations with
unjustifiable discrimination. The extent of such a mandate to
negotiate, however, remained undefined. For instance, the Appellate Body did not specify whether the U.S. import ban should
be terminated immediately or could be maintained pending its
fulfillment of further obligations to remove unjustified or arbitrary discrimination. Additionally, given the dynamic and con3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947 [hereinafter GATT],
art. XX, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 262. Paragraph (g) pertains to the preservation of natural
resources.
4. Shrimp AB Report, supra note 2, at paras. 125-45. See text accompanying
notes 21-33 infra (discussing the major legal arguments presented in the case).
The Appellate Body's flexible interpretation of this provision was welcomed
by the United States and most environmental non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), but predictably upset shrimp exporting countries in South-East Asia. See
Sabrina Shaw & Risa Schwartz, Trade and Environment in the WTO: State of Play,
36 J. WORLD TRADE 129, 147-49 (2002).
5. Shrimp AB Report, supra note 2, at para. 186.
6. GATT art. XX, supra note 3. The elements specified in the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994 are designed to prevent a member from abusing or misusing the exception clauses provided in the same provision. See also notes 34-51 infra
and accompanying text for legal analysis on the linkage of a duty to pursue international negotiations with the avoidance of unjustifiable discrimination set in the chapeau of GATT Article XX.
7. See Shrimp AB Report, supra note 2, at paras. 166-72.
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tinuing character of negotiations, it was unclear when the U.S.
duty to negotiate could be said to be fulfilled.
These issues were raised by Malaysia in a subsequent complaint to the WTO requesting an examination of U.S. compliance with the Appellate Body rulings in the Shrimp case. 8 Malaysia contended that since the United States should have
negotiated with relevant members before imposing the trade
ban in the first place, it should now lift its embargo pending
completion of the international trade talks. 9 By contrast, the
United States took the position that its action was justifiable
and thus could be maintained as long as it had fulfilled the obligation provided in the chapeau of Article XX.1o Malaysia's complaint against the United States in the Shrimp 21.5 case proved
a good opportunity for the WTO to define and elaborate the legal
implications of the duty to negotiate, in view of the progress
made between the United States and shrimp exporting countries of South-East Asia in the conservation and management of
sea turtles.
Part I of this Article discusses how an obligation to seek
multilateral negotiations and consensus in dealing with transboundary environmental problems has been fairly confirmed in
the GATT/WTO regime. Part II reviews the secondary dispute
between Malaysia and the United States. Part III aims to
evaluate the legal reasoning delivered in the WTO's compliance
decisions, particularly those illuminating the relations between
the duty to negotiate and a provisionally justified trade measure. Part IV analyzes how a country imposing the trade ban
should comply with the obligation to engage in international negotiations and cooperation.

8. See WTO Panel Report: United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products-Recourseto Article 21.5 by Malaysia, WT/DS58/RW,
circulated June 15, 2001, at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Shrimp 21.5 Panel Report].
Malaysia brought this case under Article 21.5 of the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 2, reprinted in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE
LEGAL TEXTS 421 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. For an analytical review of Article 21.5
of the DSU, see Jason E. Kearns & Steve Charnovitz, Adjudicating Compliance in
the WTO: A Review of DSUArticle 21.5, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 331-52 (2002).
9. See Shrimp 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 8, at para. 3.99.
10. See id. at para. 3.102(c).
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I. THE RECOGNITION OF A DUTY TO SEEK
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS IN DEALING WITH
TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES UNDER
THE WTO/GATT'S JURISPRUDENCE
The requirement to enter into cross-boundary negotiations
in dealing with global environmental problems is not novel. In
terms of the consistency of unilateral trade measures for environmental purposes under the GATT rules, the concept was
substantially employed in the 1991 GATT Tuna/Dolphin decision. 11 In deciding, inter alia, whether the U.S. import ban
against Mexico's tuna products met the "necessity" requirement
specified in the exception paragraph (b) of GATT Article XX, the
GATT panel found the measure unnecessary mainly on the
ground that the United States failed to pursue other alternatives reasonably available to it.12 The panel indicated that
rather than trade restrictions, the preferred course would have
been to seek international negotiations with a view toward engaging in concerted efforts to protect dolphins whose activities
have a transboundary nature. 13 Such an idea reflected a fundamental mandate in contemporary international law governing
the environment, namely the principle of international cooperation in coping with global environmental issues. As Professor
Kiss observed, "the whole of international environmental law is
based on this principle." 14 The duty to cooperate, indeed, is a
customary element of international law that is reflected in a va15
riety of instruments.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See generally Tuna I, supra note 1.
See id. at para. 5.28.
See id.
Alexandre Kiss, The Rio Declarationon Environment and Development, in

THE ENVIRONMENT AFTER RIO: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 55, 57 n.8

(Luigi Campiglio et. al. eds., 1994).
15. See, e.g., Principle 24 of the Declaration of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972), UNITED NATIONS, REPORT OF THE
UN CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14, U.N.
Sales No. E.73.II.A.14 (1972), reprinted in 26 U.N.Y.B. 319, 321, and Principles 7,
12, 14 and 27 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14,
1992, Resolution 1: Adoption of Texts on Environment and Development, Annex I,
UNITED

NATIONS,

REPORT

OF THE

UN

CONFERENCE

ON

ENVIRONMENT

AND

DEVELOPMENT 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol.I), U.N. Sales No. E.93.I.8
(1993),
available
at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126lannexl.htm [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. Each of these provisions calls on states
to cooperate with one another.
Some treaties also codify the obligation to cooperate. See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on
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Although the GATT did not adopt the Tuna/Dolphin decision, that decision's preference for multilateral solutions over
unilaterally imposed trade-related measures has either influenced or been incorporated into subsequent international instruments. 16 The influence can best be witnessed in some of the
principles expressed in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. 17 In response to increasing concern
over the conflict between free trade and environmental protection, Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration demanded mutual support between trade and environmental regimes. In addition, it
embraced a preference for multilateral solutions in dealing with
transboundary environmental problems. The text provides:
States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to economic growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better address the problems of
environmental degradation. Trade policy measures for environmental
purposes should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. Unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided. Environmental
measures addressing transboundaryor global environmentalproblems
18
should, as far as possible, be based on an internationalconsensus.

The legal implications embodied in the Principle, irrespective of its soft-law character, proved to be a beneficial reference
in supplementing later disputes that needed to take into account the best interests of global community over environmental
concern. 19
Faced with a wave of criticism over the GATT's promotion
20
of trade liberalization at the expense of environmental merits,
Climate Change, Preamble, New York, May 9, 1992, art. 3, paras. 1-2; art. 4, 31
I.L.M. 849, 851-59, availableat http://www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/
conveng.pdf; Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, art. 5,
SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, HANDBOOK OF THE
CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 6 (2001), available at http://www.biodiv.org
/doc/legallcbd-en.pdf [hereinafter Convention on Biological Diversity]. See generally
PATRICIA BIRNIE & ALAN BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT 104-05
(2d ed. 2002); PHILLIPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
197-98 (1995).
16. For a discussion of the development on this issue since the 1991 Tuna decision, see Kuei-Jung Ni, ContemporaryProspects for the Applicationof Principle 12 of
the Rio Declaration,14 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 9-33 (2001).
17. Rio Declaration, supra note 15.
18. Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration, supra note 15, at 5 (emphasis added).
19. Ni, supranote 16, at 32-33.
20. See generally DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE,
ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE 52-54 (1994); Janet McDonald, Greening the
GATT: Harmonizing Free Trade and Environmental Protection in the New World
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the WTO, the successor of the GATT, found it necessary to incorporate environmental concerns into its system. As a result,
the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement not only addressed
the significance of free trade and market access, but also highlighted the value of sustainable development. 21 Apart from the
GATT 1994, Article XX (b) and (g), several WTO agreements, including the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), also provide certain exceptions for
22
national policy in pursuing legitimate environmental goals.
Nevertheless, whether the trade regime would pay due regard to environmental interests, however, could not be determined until a relevant dispute occurred. Then, in 1996, the
United States invoked its national legislation, Section 609 of
Public Law 101-162,23 prohibiting the importation of the shrimp

products from Southeast Asian countries whose shrimp harvesting methods led to an incidental killing of marine turtles. Certain countries challenged the U.S. embargo at the WTO, alleging unfair trade practices. 24 This dispute provided an excellent
opportunity to examine the extent to which the newly created
multilateral trade organization can achieve harmony in upholding free trade rules for exporting members on the one hand,
while showing its respect for national environmental policy on
the other.
Like the previous Tuna dispute, the main battlefield in the
Shrimp cases rested on the interpretation of GATT Article XX,
focusing on the environmental exceptions in paragraphs (b), (g),
and its chapeau. 2 5 Again, the dispute focused on whether there
was a geographic or jurisdictional limitation on paragraphs (b)
Order, 23 ENVTL. L. 397, 405 n.32 (1993).
21. WTO Agreement, supra note 8, reprinted in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS:
THE LEGAL TEXTS 4 (1994).
22. See generally MITSUO MATSUSHITA et al, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY, 441-442 (2003).

23. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, The Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-162, §609, 103 Stat. 988, 1037-38
(1989). Section 609 of Public Law 101-162 was codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1537, amending the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1599 (2004).
24. For the factual and regulatory aspects of the trade embargo, see WTO
Panel Report: United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, WTJDS58R, Apr. 6, 1998 (adopted May 15, 1998), 3 INT'L TRADE L. REP.
1355, availableat http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Shrimp Panel Report].
25. Shrimp AB Report, supra note 2, at paras. 111-88.

2004]

U.S.-MALAYSL4 SHRIMP/TURTLE NEGOTIATIONS

117

and (g), or whether a member could invoke those exceptions to
protect environmental interests beyond its territory. 26 The
shrimp-exporting countries adopted the same strategy as that of
Mexico in the 1991 Tuna case, 27 arguing that those exception28
clauses could only be invoked for protecting national interests.
Since the sea turtles to be killed by Southeast Asian fishing
practices were located beyond the borders of the United States,
they maintained that the U.S. import restrictions did not qualify
for an exception under either paragraph (b) or (g).2 9 By contrast, the United States insisted that these provisions contained
no such geographic limitation. 30 The Appellate Body eventually
avoided dealing with the justification of extraterritorial applica31
tion of environmental trade measures by the United States.
Rather, considering the highly migratory nature of sea turtles
that may be under the jurisdiction of the United States, the tribunal recognized that there was a sufficient linkage between the
species and the United States. 32 In effect, the trade ban on
shrimp products based on Section 609 was considered to be a
measure of "conserving natural resources" under Article XX
(g).33
Since the U.S. trade measure survived the test of paragraph
(g), 34 the Appellate Body moved to an examination of the consistency of the application of Section 609 with the requirements
embodied in Article XX's chapeau. 35 In contrast with the Tuna
cases, a duty to negotiate was not invoked in dealing with the
validity of the U.S. shrimp import ban under the respective
clauses. Rather, the requirement became a useful tool for illuminating the chapeau's implications. In pondering whether the
ecological trade restrictions constituted unjustified discrimination, the Appellate Body delivered the message that seeking international negotiations on a bilateral, regional or multilateral
basis should play a critical role in such a judgment. The message is evident from the following passage:

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Shrimp Panel Report, supranote 24, at paras. 3.183-.234.
See Tuna I, supra note 1.
See Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 24, at para. 3.183.
See id. at paras. 3.176, 3.179, 3.181.
See id. at paras. 3.184-186.
See Shrimp AB Report, supranote 2, at para. 133.
See id. at para. 133.
Id. at paras. 125-45.
See id. at para. 134.
See id. at paras. 146-86.
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Another aspect of the application of Section 609 that bears heavily in
any appraisal of justifiable or unjustifiable discriminationis the failure
of the United States to engage the appellees, as well as other Members
exporting shrimp to the United States, in serious, across-the-boardnegotiations with the objective of concluding bilateral or multilateral
agreements for the protection and conservation of sea turtles, before enforcing the import
prohibition against the shrimp exports of those
36
other Members.

According to the Appellate Body's observation, the connec-

tion of the U.S. failure to negotiate with the element of unjustifiable discrimination has three components. First, although
Section 609 requires the Executive Branch to engage in negotiations,3 7 the WTO dispute settlement organ found that "[a]part
from the negotiation of the Inter-American Convention for the
Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles ...which concluded
in 1996, the record before the Panel does not indicate any serious, substantial efforts to carry out these express directions of
Congress." 38 Second, it fully recognized that the nature of the
conservation of marine turtles that requires multilateral cooperation should guarantee the linkage of an obligation to negotiate with the determination of an alleged unjustifiable discrimination. 39 It also noted that a number of relevant international
40
instruments, in particular Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration,
41
have mandated such obligations.
36. Id. at para. 166 (emphasis added).
37. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, The Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-162, §609(a), 103 Stat. 988, 1037-38
(1989).
38. Shrimp AB Report, supra note 2, at para. 167.
39. See id. at para. 168.
40. See Rio Declaration, supra note 15. A variety of international instruments
apart from the Rio Declaration echo such a mandate. See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 15, art. 5; paragraph 2.2 of Agenda 21, June 14, 1992,
Resolution 1: Adoption of Texts on Environment and Development, Annex II,
UNITED NATIONS, REPORT OF THE UN CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT 14, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol.I), U.N. Sales No. E.93.I.8
(1993), available at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/
agenda2 ltoc.htm [hereinafter Agenda 21].
41. See Shrimp AB Report, supra note 2, at para. 168. The Appellate Body declared:
[The protection and conservation of highly migratory species of sea turtles,
that is, the very policy objective of the measure, demands concerted and cooperative efforts on the part of the many countries whose waters are traversed in the course of recurrent sea turtle migrations. The need for, and the
appropriateness of, such efforts have been recognized in the WTO itself as
well as in a significant number of other international instruments and declarations ... Of particularrelevance is Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development ....
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Third, the practices of the United States regarding the differential implementation of negotiations were an indication of
The evidence showed that the
unjustifiable discrimination.
efforts to negotiate and conserious
United States did not make
with those Asian nations
mechanisms
clude any international
States before imposUnited
to
the
that export shrimp products
42
negotiated seriously
it
had
By contrast,
ing the import ban.
and reached a
countries
American
with five South and Central
for
Convention)
Inter-American
as
the
regional treaty (known
43
In
summary,
turtles.
of
sea
the protection and conservation
the Appellate Body concluded:
The unjustifiable nature of this discrimination emerges clearly when
we consider the cumulative effects of the failure of the United States to
pursue negotiations for establishing consensual means of protection
and conservation of the living marine resources here involved, notwithstanding the explicit statutory direction in Section 609 itself to
for the development of bilatinitiate negotiations as soon as possible
44
eral and multilateral agreements.

Overall, the Appellate Body's ruling has arguably demonstrated that the normal rule requiring negotiations with respect
to international environmental law has been squarely applied in
the context of the Article XX chapeau condition forbidding unjustifiable discrimination. 45 It may also be inferred by the above
jurisprudence that, in order to avoid unjustified discrimination,
a duty to seek negotiations aimed at reaching consensual and
46
multilateral solutions has to be fulfilled.
The WTO's jurisprudence may not be appreciated by authors who deem it unreasonable to link the avoidance of unjustiId. (emphasis added).
42. See id. at para. 171.
43. Id. at paras. 169-71.
44. See id. at para. 172.
45. See, e.g., Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy-and Back Again:
The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INTL L. 96, 110-12 (2002)
[hereinafter Howse, Politics to Technocracy].
46. See, e.g., Louise de La Fayette, United States-Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products-Recourseto Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia,
96 AM. J. INTL L. 685, 691 (2002); see also Shrimp 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 8,
at paras. 5.47-48 (confirming the obligation of the United States to negotiate.) But
cf. Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New
Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 491,
508 (2002) [hereinafter Howse, New Legal Baseline]. Howse takes a cautious stand,
arguing that "[tihe AB was not incorporating into the chapeau a duty to negotiate
from international environmental law. It was merely using a baseline from international environmental law to determine whether, in the circumstances, the discriminatory behavior of the U.S. was also unjustifiable." Id.
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fiable discrimination to multilateral actions, disfavoring the use
of other non-trade elements in interpreting the chapeau's provision. For example, Sanford Gaines asserts that "[t]here is no
inherent connection between unilateralism and discrimination.
Establishing international negotiations as a precondition to the
invocation of Article XX unreasonably stretches the concept of
"justifiability" into sensitive areas of national policy discretion.
Multilateralism may be preferable, but it is not obligatory."47
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body's eagerness to adopt international environmental rules should be consistent with the
provisions on treaty interpretation in the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(DSU) that require taking into account customary norms of international law, 48 as stipulated in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of the Treaties. 49 Further, there seems no ground for prohibiting the trade regime from using other non-WTO/GATT
rules, which may be beneficial to the illumination of its norms.
Subsequently, the WTO Panel, in assessing the conformity
of the U.S. implementation measures with the Appellate Body's
original rulings in its recent Shrimp Recourse Report, also endorsed the applicability of the environmental mandate to the
disputes between the parties. By reference to the Vienna Convention regarding the interpretation of treaties, it observed:
We also have evidence in the context of Article XX showing that preference must be given to a multilateral approach in terms of protection
of the environment. In this respect, we note the content of the 1996
Report of the CTE, where the CTE endorsed and supported "multilateral solutions based on international cooperation and consensus as the
best and most effective way for governments to tackle environmental
problems of a transboundary or global nature." Insofar as this report
can be deemed to embody the opinion of the WTO Members, it could be
argued that it records evidence of "subsequentpractice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation"(Article 31.3(b) of the Vienna Convention) and as
such should be taken into account in the interpretation of the provisions concerned. However, even if it is not to be considered as evidence
of a subsequent practice, it remains the expression of a common opinion of Members and is therefore relevant in assessing the scope of the
chapeau of Article XX.

47. Sanford Gaines, The WTO's Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau:A
Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 739,
805 (2001.) [hereinafter Gaines, Disguised Restriction].
48. See DSU, supra note 8, art. 3.2.
49. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 31-32, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 340 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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Finally, we note that the Appellate Body, like the Original Panel, referred to a number of international agreements, many of which have
been ratified or otherwise accepted by the parties to this dispute. Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention provides that, in interpreting a
treaty, there shall be taken into account, together with the context,
"any relevant rule of internationallaw applicable to the relations between the parties" We note that, with the exception of the Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals
(CMS), Malaysia and the United States have accepted or are committed to comply with all of the international instruments referred to by
50
the Appellate Body in paragraph 168 of its Report.

The Panel's tendency actually proves to be in line with the
general views of most writers who are in favor of a broader approach of applying non-trade rules as long as the practice is in
51
conformity with the Vienna Convention.
In addition, it is submitted that there seems to be no reasonable basis that prevents the WTO from applying other areas
of norms as long as they prove supportive and helpful in solving
the dispute that is required to take into account non-trade interests, such as environmental concerns. As the Appellate Body
observed in the Gasoline case, the device of the chapeau is to ensure that exceptions in GATT Article XX are not to be abused or
misused. 52 It also mentioned in the Shrimp ruling that "[t]he
location of the line of equilibrium, as expressed in the chapeau,
is not fixed and unchanging; the line moves as the kind and the
shape of the measures at stake vary as the facts making up specific cases differ." 53 In its Recourse Report, the Panel correctly
added, "the position of the line itself depends on the type of
measure imposed and on the particular circumstance of this
case."

54

50. Shrimp 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 8, at paras. 5.56-57 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
51. See generally MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 72-75 (Routledge 2d ed. 1999); David Palmeter & Petros
C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 398, 398413 (1998); Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public InternationalLaw in the WTO: How
Far Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535, 535-78 (2001); see also Lorand Bartels, Article XX of GATT and the Problem of ExtraterritorialJurisdiction:The Case of Trade
Measures for the Protection of Human Rights, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 353, 360-61
(2002); de La Fayette, supra note 46, at 689, 692; Howse, New Legal Baseline, supra
note 46, at 518.
52. WTO Appellate Body Report: United States-Standardsfor Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2IAB/R, Apr. 29, 1996 (adopted on May 20, 1996)
at 22, 35 I.L.M. 603, 626 (1996), available at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Gasoline].
53. Shrimp AB Report, supra note 2, at para. 159.
54. Shrimp 21.5 Panel Report, supranote 8, at para. 5.51.
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Therefore, the method of interpretation of the chapeau's requirements should be as flexible and dynamic as possible. The
legal implications embodied in the chapeau of GATT Article XX
should also be analyzed in a way that conforms to specific situations in individual cases. In the writer's opinion, the approach
adopted by the WTO jurisprudence can be generally upheld and
honored.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE FURTHER DISPUTE REGARDING
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE APPELLATE BODYS
RULINGS OF SHRIMP/TURTLE DECISION
In the original Shrimp dispute, the Appellate Body finally
concluded that the U.S. shrimp embargoes, though provisionally
justified under Article XX (g), nonetheless failed to meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX and therefore were not
justified under Article XX of the GATT 1994. 55 It recommended

that the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) request the United
States to bring its trade policies into conformity with the obligations of the United States under that Agreement. 56 In order to
comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, under a mutually agreed upon thirteen-month reasonable period of
time, the United States started to take certain actions.5 7 These
included revising its Guidelines for Implementation of Section
609,58 and some efforts to engage in consultations with Asian

shrimp exporting nations. 59 These latter actions prove most
relevant to this study.
On the other hand, the United States still maintained its
shrimp import prohibition pursuant to Section 609, and there
was no sign that the ban would be removed. Malaysia argued
that the continuation of the trade restrictions was not consistent
with the DSB's rulings, and requested the DSB to establish a
Panel to examine the legality of the U.S. implementation.6 0 It
requested the Panel to find that the import restrictions should
be lifted and that the United States should allow the importation of shrimp products in an unrestricted manner. 61 In re55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Shrimp AB Report, supranote 2, at para. 187.
Id. at para. 188.
Shrimp 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 8, at para. 1.2.
Id. at paras. 2.22-.32.
Id. at paras. 3.68-75.
Id. at para. 1.4.
Id.
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sponse, the United States argued that this proceeding was to
decide whether it had already complied with the rulings and
recommendations of the DSB in light of its modification of the
application of Section 609.62
Since the main argument relates to whether and to what
extent the U.S. modification and adjustment met the conditions
set in the chapeau of Article XX, it is clear that the fulfillment of
a duty to negotiate then becomes one of the key arguments
raised by both parties. For better or worse, the nature and application of such mandate has been further illuminated by the
compliance reports of the Panel and the Appellate Body. 63 In
view of the contentions by both parties and the rulings of the
WTO organs, some relevant issues relating to international negotiations are worth examining.
III. THE STATUS OF AN OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PURPOSE IN THE CONTEXT OF
ARTICLE XX OF THE GATT 1994 AND ITS RELATIONSHIP
WITH A PROVISIONALLY JUSTIFIED MEASURE IMPOSED
UNILATERALLY
As mentioned above, the Appellate Body considered the application of Section 609 to be unjustified discrimination mainly
because the United States failed to fulfill the mandate to conduct international negotiations with the complaining nations before imposing the import prohibition on shrimp products on a
unilateral basis. 64 How this finding will be interpreted, specifically the term "before," will influence the outcome regarding
whether the provisionally justified import ban must be removed
at the first stage. The issue also involves the relationship between the efforts to seek multilaterally negotiated solutions and
unilaterally applied trade embargoes. It is beyond doubt that,
in the general sense, WTO jurisprudence in dealing with transboundary environmental problems such as dolphin or turtle conservation favors multilateral solutions over unilateral meas-

62. Id. at para. 3.4.
63. Shrimp 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 8, at paras. 5.43-.88; WTO Appellate
Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products-Recourseto Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB[RW, Oct. 2,
2001 (adopted Oct. 22, 2001), at paras. 115-34, at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter
Shrimp 21.5 AB Report].
64. Shrimp AB Report, supranote 2, at para.166.
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ures. 65 The legal effects that would be produced by such an approach, however, cannot easily be found in the ruling. The
overall comprehension of the Appellate Body's findings may lead
to four possible propositions, which underline differential relations and interactions between multilateral and unilateral actions. The following order is based on the degree of supremacy
of the multilateral approach over unilateral measures:
No unilateral measure should be taken or maintained without first resorting to international negotiations. Before the unilateral imposition of an import ban, efforts to negotiate must be
undertaken or even exhausted. Upon the violation of the mandate, a previously imposed measure should be removed accordingly.
Before an international consensus or agreement has been
attained, states should refrain from taking unilateral measures
to address transboundary environmental problems.
Any unilateral measure should be based on an international
consensus. In effect, a multilateral consensus may subsume or
override a unilateral one. The unilateral measure may be
deemed illegal upon inconsistency with the will of international
decisions.
Unilateral measures may operate in tandem with international negotiations. The measure may be maintained as long as
international negotiations can be engaged later or eventually.
As a result, the term "before," as spelled out in the Appellate
Body's ruling, carries virtually no legal consequence.
The first three arguments highlight the priority, or even
superiority, of multilateral approaches over unilateral ones, but
generate different legal effects. In contrast, the last proposition
does not consider international efforts superior to nationally
imposed measures. Consequently, such measures may continue
to survive even though efforts to negotiate multilaterally were
not pursued in advance of imposing the unilateral action.
In its argument in the Shrimp 21.5 dispute, Malaysia's
strategy was to persuade the Panel to accept the first proposition-the one that is most skeptical of unilateral actions. Malaysia urged the Panel to accord great weight to the mandate to
pursue negotiations-so much weight, in fact, that the United
States's provisionally-justified trade ban could not be maintained because the measure contravened an obligation to pursue

65. See Ni, supra note 16, at 28-32; Shrimp 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 8, at
para. 5.58.
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international negotiations in advance. 66 Malaysia further contended that subsequent efforts made by the United States could
not alter the existence of an import prohibition being imposed
67
before new actions were taken by the United States.
Malaysia also advanced arguments that mirror the second
possible proposition indicated above: that states should refrain
from taking unilateral measures to address transboundary environmental problems before an international consensus or
agreement has been attained. Referring to a variety of international instruments and declarations cited by the Appellate Body,
Malaysia maintained it was a "corollary" to the belief of the
need for a preliminary international consensus that:
No unilateral actions to deal with environmental measures may be imIn the abposed before any international consensus is reached ....
sence of any mutually agreed international standard to conserve and
protect sea turtles, recognition of each country's sovereign right to
manage and maintain its own conservation programme for sea turtles
should be respected. This is consonant with the principle of national
sovereignty which is accorded recognition in several multilateral environmental ... treaties .... 68

The United States, however, disagreed vehemently with
Malaysia's contentions. If the rule proposed by Malaysia were
66.

Shrimp 21.5 Panel Report, supranote 8, at paras. 3.99-.100.
As Malaysia pointed out, another reason to support the lifting of the import
prohibition was that "an alternative course of action was reasonably open to the
United States for securing the policy goal of its measure." Id. at para. 3.99. Malaysia based this argument on the fact that the United States has participated in the
development of an Indian Ocean and Southeast Asian Regional Agreement on the
Conservation of marine turtles. Australia, in its third-party submission, also expressed the view that alternatives to the U.S. import prohibition were available. See
id at para. 4.6. Overall, more than half of third-party submissions were of the view
that the U.S. import ban should be lifted in order to comply with the recommendation of the DSU. Id. at paras. 4.26, 4.32, 4.64, 4.110.
The United States, for its part, may take the position that such a trade restriction may be instrumental in urging Malaysia to negotiate and honor international programs seriously. This view is supported by some scholars, who argue that
unilateral trade measures are able to serve as powerful leverage aimed at changing
environmental practices of other nations. Sanford Gaines, for example, examines
the case of the successful Inter-American Convention and concludes that the unilateral and non-consensual nature of Section 609 was an impetus for "changing policy
preferences in the targeted countries and fostering the political climate for a successful international negotiation." Gaines, Disguised Restriction, supra note 47, at
816; see also Sanford Gaines, Foreword:Integrating Environmental Considerations
into the World Trading System, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. I, xiv (1994). See generally
Edith Brown Weiss, Environment and Trade as Partners in Sustainable Development: A Commentary, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 728, 732 (1992).
67. Shrimp 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 8, at para. 3.100.
68. Id. at para. 3.104.
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sustained, the United States argued, the consequence would be
the evisceration of the Article XX(g) exception. 69 The United
States further recalled that Section 609's import ban has provisionally met the requirement of Article XX(g), even though at
70
that point no negotiations had been initiated.
The United States, for its part, articulated a position that
corresponded with the fourth possible proposition: that unilateral measures may operate in tandem with international negotiations. It rejected Malaysia's argument that internationally
negotiated efforts must be conducted prior to the imposition of
an import ban, arguing instead that it should be allowed to
maintain its previously imposed prohibition on shrimp imports.
First, since the import ban had already taken effect, the
United States pointed out that it had become impractical (and
indeed, impossible) for it to travel back in time to conduct negotiations with the complaining countries before resorting to the
unilateral measure.7 1 On this point, the European Community
(EC), in its third-party submission, agreed with the United
States.7 2 Second, the DSU set a thirteen-month reasonable period of time during which the United States had to comply with
the recommendations of the DSU. The United States was of the
opinion that it was its right under the DSU to maintain the import restrictions during such a period.7 3 Finally, the United
States asserted that the Appellate Body's report did not specifically request the lifting of the import prohibition, but rather
simply directed the United States to apply Section 609 in a
manner that avoided unjustified discrimination.7 4 The United
States claimed it had addressed the discriminatory aspects of its
implementation of the ban and thus was not required to remove
75
the ban itself.

Australia adopted a position in the Shrimp 21.5 case that
reflected the third possible proposition: that a multilateral consensus may subsume or override a unilateral one, and that the
unilateral measure may be deemed illegal upon inconsistency
with the will of international decisions. Impressed with the
progress of international negotiations which produced the

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

para.
para.
para.
para.
para.
para.
para.

3.105.
3.106.
3.102(a).
3.103.
3.102(b).
3.102(c).
3.100.
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Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation and Management of Marine Turtles and their Habitats of Indian Ocean
and South-East Asian Region (MOU),76 Australia was of the
opinion that international efforts would generate better and
77
more comprehensive results than unilateral trade embargoes.
Further, Australia's overall reading of the Appellate Body's rulings led it to conclude that measures based on "consensual and
multilateral procedures" are consistent with the United States's
obligation to conform to the prohibition against unjustified discrimination.78 The United States opposed Australia's assertions
79
by saying that the Appellate Body had made no such finding.
Further, it replied that from a practical point of view, "such conclusions would be illogical and untenable, since, depending on
the position of the Parties to the negotiation, it may not be pos80
sible to reach consensus."
Of the four possible propositions regarding the interaction
between multilateral and unilateral approaches, the Panel
seemed inclined to favor the fourth proposition, the one which is
least skeptical of unilateral actions taken to promote conservation. The Panel did acknowledge that, pursuant to paragraph
166 of the Shrimp Appellate Body Report, the United States had
an obligation to seek international negotiations "before" the enforcement of a unilaterally designed import prohibition.8 1 Nevertheless, instead of clarifying the legal implications of the term
"before," the Panel in the Shrimp 21.5 decision simply endorsed
the U.S. understanding, stating that:
This does not mean that, in terms of implementation, the United
States would have to go back in time to correct the original error,something obviously impossible. The question of the conformity with the
DSB recommendations and rulings has to be assessed on the basis of
the actions taken by the United States subsequent to the adoption of
8 2
the Panel and the Appellate Body reports.

In doing so, the Panel missed a chance to clarify the meaning of "before." Indeed, the critical issue facing the Panel was
whether or to what extent it should conduct an interpretation of
the word "before" specified in the original Appellate Body Re76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
added).

Id. at paras. 3.88, 4.5.
Id. at para. 4.6.
Id. at para. 4.21.
Id. at para. 3.110.
Id. at para. 3.111.
Id. at para. 5.63, citing Shrimp AB Report, supra note 2, at para. 166.
Shrimp 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 8, at para. 5.66 n.211 (emphasis
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port. The previous ruling arguably generated some legal implications, assuming the Appellate Body deliberately employed the
term. This question did not relate to the feasibility of the "traveling back" problem, but whether, in the Appellate Body's decision, it had intended to confirm the priority of international negotiations over unilateral measures even when the unilateral
measure had been applied before multilateral actions were conducted. If the Appellate Body did have such an intention, the
implication would be that a previously imposed import ban cannot be maintained until international negotiations have been
pursued.
Using a technical problem as the vehicle for interpreting
the term may obscure the Panel's real task and make its determination less convincing and irresponsible. Even if the term
"before" did not, in fact, carry any legal substance, it remained
the responsibility of the Panel to explain why the term was a
redundancy in its original context. So far, it has failed to do so.
Further, the Panel seemed not to support propositions two
and three, under which unilateral measures would be more subject to multilateral controls. This implies that unilateral measures might run independently of international frameworks, considering that "if the Appellate Body had intended to imply that
no measure could be adopted outside the framework of an international agreement on the protection and conservation of sea
turtles, it would not have continued with its review of the unilateral measure applied pursuant to Section 609."83
Overall, the Panel was relatively sympathetic to the United
States's contentions. As such, it declined to confirm the superiority of multilateral approaches over unilateral means, despite
considering unilateral measures less acceptable.8 4 Unfortunately, the Appellate Body did not expressly deal with this critical issue in its review of the Panel Report, probably because the
Appellant, Malaysia, did not explicitly appeal the ruling of the
Panel concerning the interpretation and application of the term
8
"before." 5
From another perspective, however, it seems reasonable to
assume that the WTO should have honored the supremacy of a
multilateral approach to the extent that the import prohibition
should be lifted if a plain interpretation of the DSB's ruling of
the 1998 Shrimp decision had been adopted. The logical proce83.
84.
85.

Id. at para. 5.64.
Id. at para. 5.59.
Shrimp 21.5 AB Report, supra note 63, at paras. 16-26.

2004]

U.S.-MALAYSL4 SHRIMP/TURTLE NEGOTIATIONS

129

dure for U.S. compliance might involve three steps. First, it
should have terminated the embargo. Second, it should have
started to engage in international negotiations. Finally, after
the fulfillment of this obligation, it enjoyed the discretion to decide whether the imports ban should be reinstated or not. Then,
the provisionally justified measure may have secured eventual
justification under the GATT.86 Since more comprehensive programs have marched toward maturity and should be more effective in addressing the conservation of sea turtles,8 7 it seems difficult to understand why the ban that merely deals with a
limited problem in the overall picture of sea turtle conservation,
namely the method of shrimp harvesting, must be maintained
88
at any cost.
IV. THE OBLIGATION TO SEEK INTERNATIONAL
NEGOTIATIONS: HOW FAR SHOULD IT GO?
A. OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE VS. OBLIGATION TO CONCLUDE AN
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT
The work of international negotiations for a particular purpose is a dynamic task, involving a continuous process in which
a number of parties are bound to participate and to share the
89
burden or even the risk in order to secure a satisfactory result.
Normally, an ideal accomplishment would be the conclusion of
an international agreement, either in the form of a non-binding
instrument or a binding treaty or convention. 90 For instance,
the Inter-American Convention was the result of successful multilateral negotiations for the conservation and management of
marine turtles on a regional basis. 91
86. Apart from the element of international negotiations, however, the United
States must meet other obligations such as the removal of arbitrary discrimination
in order to be in full compliance with the conditions set forth in the GATT's Article
XX chapeau. See id. at paras. 5.26-.37.
87. See Australia's third party submission in id. at paras. 4.1-.26.
88. As Australia noted, international solutions have started to "address the
wide range of threats to sea turtles, including habitat destruction, direct harvesting
and trade, fisheries by-catch, pollution and other man-induced sources of mortality."
Id. at para. 4.5.
89. See Shrimp 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 8, at para. 5.67.
90.

See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supranote 15, at 10-11.

91. The Inter-American Convention entered into force on May 2, 2001. See
Shrimp 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 8, at para. 5.71. As of May 15, 2001, nine
countries have become parties, including Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras,
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In the context of the Shrimp decision, however, it was unclear whether the Appellate Body intended to require the conclusion of an international agreement in order for the U.S. import ban to be valid, or whether the United States was merely
obliged to make good faith efforts to negotiate with the complaining members. The Appellate Body's decision states, in pertinent part, that "the failure of the United States to engage the
appellees, as well as other Members exporting shrimp to the
United States, in serious across-the-board negotiations with the
objective of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements for
the protection and conservation of sea turtles" was the reason
why the U.S. trade measure was found to be in violation of the
chapeau of Article XX.92

Malaysia favored an expansive construction of the mandate
to negotiate, arguing that the original Appellate Body's ruling
on the fulfillment of conditions of the chapeau of Article XX demand the conclusion of such an international agreement before
any trade-restricting measure could be imposed. 93 Such a construction would have imposed a greater burden on the United
States when implementing trade-restricting measures. Malaysia did not, however, specify a solid legal ground for sustaining
its contention. It simply claimed that the argument was "[a]
corollary to its submissions on the need for preliminary international consensus ....

particularly borne out by the references

cited by the Appellate Body to the various international instruments and declarations." 94 From Malaysia's perspective, each
country should retain the sovereign right to follow its own conservation plan until an international consensus can be
95
reached.
The United States responded to Malaysia's claim by presenting several arguments. First, with regard to the general design and structure of Section 609, the United States argued that
the Appellate Body had not objected to a construction of the law
that merely mandates the initiation of sea turtle conservation
negotiations with other countries, but "does not contemplate the
completion of such negotiations .... "

96

Second, in reading the

Mexico, The Netherlands, Peru, Venezuela, and the United States. See Shrimp 21.5
Panel Report, supra note 8, at para. 5.71 n.215.
92. Shrimp AB Report, supra note 2, at para. 166 (emphasis added).
93. Shrimp 21.5 Panel Report, supranote 8, at para. 3.104, 5.62.
94. Id. at para. 3.104.
95. Id.
96. Id. at para. 3.106.
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ruling of the Appellate Body specified above, the United States
continued to argue that it only had to "pursue" negotiations and
"nowhere did the Appellate Body purport to impose a requirement that the parties to such negotiations must reach an
agreement." 97 Finally, the United States made a powerful claim
in justifying a narrow interpretation of such ruling:
The United States can control, and is responsible for its actions. Thus,
the United States can take steps to meet the requirements of the chapeau by expending efforts to negotiate. However, the United States
cannot control, and cannot be held responsible, for the actions of its negotiatingpartners. It would not make sense if the issue of US compliance turned on the actions of other WTO Members, including the complaining parties. This would be the precise result if, as Malaysia
suggests, the United States must reach agreement with other parties
98
before applying the measure.

The Panel in the Shrimp 21.5 decision did not devote too
much ink to its justification of why the United States was not
required to conclude an agreement in order to comply with the
ruling of the Appellate Body. Rather, it favored the position of
the United States simply by examining the plain meaning of the
text of the Shrimp decision. 99 It found that
From the terms used, it appears.., that the Appellate Body had in
mind a negotiation, not the conclusion of an agreement. If the Appellate Body had considered that an agreement had to be concluded before any measure can be taken by the United States, it would not have
used the terms 'with the objective'; it would have simply stated that an
agreement had to be concluded.100

The Appellate Body in the Shrimp 21.5 decision generally
upheld the Panel ruling, elaborating upon the Panel's original
finding and developing additional reasons for crediting the
United States's argument. The Appellate Body recognized the
nature of concluding a multilateral agreement, an obligation
which could not be achieved through the efforts of a single country. Instead, the Appellate Body ruled that the task "[riequires
the cooperation and commitment of many countries."'101 Hence,
to require the conclusion of a multilateral agreement as a condition of avoiding unjustifiable discrimination, in its view, would
result in an unreasonable consequence. It correctly found that
such requirement "would mean that any country party to the
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at para. 3.114 (emphasis added).
Id. at para. 3.117 (emphasis added).
See supranote 92 and accompanying text.
Shrimp 21.5 Panel Report, supranote 8, at para. 5.64 (emphasis added).
Id. at para. 123.
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negotiations with the United States, whether a WTO Member or
not, would have, in effect, a veto over whether the United States
could fulfill its WTO obligations."102 In addition, it managed to
reinforce the conviction that no requirement for concluding an
agreement had been imposed upon the United States, although
it did find that the character of the tasks to protect and conserve
the highly migratory species of sea turtles needs concerted and
cooperative efforts. The Appellate Body recalled the significance
of Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration, which proclaims,
"[e]nvironmental measures addressing transboundary or global
environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on
international consensus."'103 Nevertheless, the Appellate Body
was not convinced that such a mandate had the effect of requiring that a multilateral agreement be concluded:
Clearly, and "as far as possible", a multilateral approach is strongly
preferred. Yet it is one thing to prefer a multilateral approach in the
application of a measure that is provisionally justified under one of the
subparagraphs of Article XX of the GATT 1994; it is another to require
the conclusion of a multilateral agreement as a condition of avoiding
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" under the chapeau of Article
XX. We see, in this case, no such requirement. 104

B. SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS IN GOOD FAITH
According to the Panel, the obligation to pursue international negotiations does not go so far as to require the conclusion
of an agreement. This decision may inevitably lessen the burden on the United States in order to comply with the rulings of
the DSB. Nevertheless, the Panel struck a balance by incorporating some flavor and substance into such duty. It considered
that serious good faith efforts should be an essential standard in
determining the fulfillment of such mandate.
The introduction of the concept of good faith 10 5 into the task
102.

Id. (emphasis added).

103.

Id. at para. 124 (citing Rio Declaration, supra note 15).

104.

Shrimp 21.5 AB Report, supra note 63, at para. 124; cf. Gaines, Disguised

Restriction, supra note 47, at 820. Although Gaines generally agrees with the position of the Appellate Body on the extent of such negotiations, he questions the necessity of adding the phrase "in this case." Id. "That last qualifier, 'in this case,'

leaves one with the uneasy feeling that the preference for multilateralism remains
so strong that unilateral measures affecting transnational or global resources outside the context of any systematic effort to promote a multilateral solution, will, ipso
facto, not qualify under Article XX." Id.
105. The concept of good faith consists of the following elements: "(1) honesty in
belief or purpose, (2) faithfulness to one's duty or obligation, (3) observance of rea-
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of international negotiations represents a peculiar contribution
of the Panel in the elaboration of the substance of the mandate.
The Panel in the Shrimp 21.5 case was of the view that the concept could be embodied in the alleged "serious efforts" mainly by
referring to the finding of the Appellate Body that "the chapeau
of Article XX is but one expression of the principle of good
faith." 10 6 As to how the concept can be applied in the task of serious efforts, the Panel particularly considered the application of
good faith as a process of conducting dynamic and continuous
efforts. Overall, the Panel stressed the significance of good faith

as follows:
The notion of good faith, in relation to the issue under examination in
this section, implies a continuity of efforts which, in our opinion, is the
only way to address successfully the issue of conservation and protection of sea turtles through multilateral negotiations, as demonstrated
by the circumstances of this case. We therefore consider that, even
though the Appellate Body only refers to "serious efforts", the notion of
good faith efforts implies, inter alia, that the seriousness of the United
States' efforts in this case must be assessed over a period of time. It is
this continuity of efforts that matters, not a particular move at a given
10 7
moment, followed by inaction.

This approach signaled that the fulfillment of such efforts to
negotiate cannot simply be evaluated at a single moment, but
rather must be analyzed from a long-term perspective which
considers both the nature and duration of respective multilateral negotiations.
As mentioned above, the United States did engage in negotiations with some American countries, resulting in the formation of the Inter-American Convention.10 8 Impressed with such
an achievement, the Panel was convinced that it could provide a
vivid model for any further negotiations on similar issues. It
used the term "benchmark" in describing the status of the Consonable commercial standards of fair dealing in a given trade or business, or (4) absence of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage." BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 701 (7th ed. 1999).
106. Shrimp 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 8, at para. 5.60; see also Shrimp AB
Report, supra note 2, at para. 158. The Appellate Body regarded the principle of
good faith as a general principle of law or a general principle of international law,
which should be taken into account in the interpretation of the requirements in the
chapeau of Article XX according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
Article 31(3)(c)).
107. Shrimp 21.5 Panel Report, supranote 8, at para. 5.60 (emphasis added); see
also paras. 5.66 n.212, 5.67, 5.88, 6.1 (emphasizing the continuing nature of serious
good faith efforts, which should be conducted continuously and reassessed at any
time until the satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations).
108. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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It further

pointed out that the Convention was not required "in the field of
protection of sea turtles, but as an example of an action which
would meet the criteria of the chapeau of Article XX
"....
110
The benchmark, the Panel contended, would help gauge
whether U.S. efforts to conduct further negotiations with SouthEast Asian nations met the requirement of serious good faith."'l

Irrespective of differential situations embodied in the process of
individual multilateral negotiations, the Panel, while agreeing
that factual circumstances could "influence the duration of the
process or the end result," concluded that "any effort alleged to
be a 'serious good faith effort' must be assessed against the efforts made in relation to the conclusion of the Inter-American
Convention."112 It is true that, under the Panel's jurisprudence,
a member is not necessarily required to conclude an agreement
during the process of engaging in negotiations to avoid unjustified discrimination.11 3 In the present case, however, the element of good faith that had been displayed in the conclusion of
Inter-American Convention did imply that the United States
was obliged to take the benchmark as a model in further negotiations, which should aim at reaching a binding agreement. 1 4
The Appellate Body generally approved the approach of the
Panel, which invoked the Inter-American Convention as a useful reference with respect to making serious good faith efforts in
negotiation. 1 5 The organ further specified the reasons why it
endorsed the equation of the negotiation resulting in the InterAmerican Convention with serious good faith efforts. In contrast to the Panel, the Appellate Body made a relatively indepth analysis on the significance of the Convention:
First, we used the Inter-American Convention to show that "consensual and multilateral procedures are available and feasible for the establishment of programmes for the conservation of sea turtles." In
other words, we saw the Inter-American Convention as evidence that
an alternative course of action based on cooperation and consensus
was reasonably open to the United States. Second, we used the Inter109. Shrimp 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 8, at para. 5.71.
110. Id. at para. 5.74 (emphasis added).
111. Shrimp 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 8,at para. 5.71.
112. Id.
113. Id. at para. 5.67.
114. According to the Panel, "[t]he Inter-American Convention is evidence that it
is feasible to negotiate a binding agreement imposing the adoption of measures comparable to those applied in the United States." Shrimp 21.5 Panel Report, supra
note 8, at para. 5.75.
115. Shrimp 21.5 AB Report, supra note 63, at para. 130.
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American Convention to show the existence of "unjustifiable discrimination." The Inter-American Convention was the result of serious,
good faith efforts to negotiate a regional agreement on the protection
and conservation of turtles, including efforts made by the United
States. In the original proceedings, we saw a clear contrast between
the efforts made by the United States to conclude the Inter-American
Convention and the absence of serious efforts on the part of the United
States to negotiate other similar agreements with other WTO Members. We concluded there that such a disparity in efforts to negotiate
agreement amounted to "unjustifiable discriminaan international
11 6
tion."

On the other hand, the Appellate Body, in response to Malaysia's complaints over the term "benchmark," did recognize
that such terminology might not be appropriate. 117 Yet the
term, it believed, should not obscure the true implications of the
Panel's approach that the treaty was not deemed as an absolute
legal standard as Malaysia presumed.11 8 Rather, it served as a
basis for a comparison between the efforts of the United States
to negotiate the Inter-American Convention and negotiations
with other groups of exporting members. 119

It was true that the Appellate Body in its original Shrimp
decision repeatedly pointed out the failure of the United States
to take into account the situation of each exporting country in
the application of Section 609.120 The Panel thus contended that
the standard of taking into account the circumstance prevailing

in the other negotiating countries should be included in examining whether the United States's efforts on negotiations met the

requirement of serious good faith. The Panel recognized "[t]he
very raison d'6tre of a negotiation is to allow all parties to try to
have their situations taken into account and that adding such a
requirement could seem to be superfluous."'' 21 Nonetheless, the

Panel based the inclusion of the requirement on the following
perception:
We consider, however, that this requirement is essential in the particular context at issue. We note that Section 609 has been applied to
the whole world since 1996. Since then, any country exporting shrimp
to the United States and entering into negotiations has done so while
being subject to the requirements of Section 609. The Appellate Body
noted that the original measure, in its application, was more concerned

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at para. 128 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at para. 130.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Shrimp AB Report, supra note 2, at paras. 161, 163-64, 172, 177.
Shrimp 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 8, at para. 5.73.
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with effectively influencing WTO Members to adopt essentially the
same comprehensive regulatory regime as that applied by the United
States to its domestic shrimp trawlers, even though many of those
Members may be differently situated. We consider that, in that context, negotiators may have found themselves constrained to accept
conditions that they may not have accepted had Section 609 not been
applied. Even if Section 609 as currently applied takes more into account the existence of different conservation programmes, it can still
influence the outcome of negotiations. This is why the Panel feels it is
important to take the reality of internationalrelations into account and
considers that the standardof review of the efforts of the United States
on the internationalplane should be expressed as follows: whether the
United States made serious good faith efforts to negotiate an international agreement, taking into account the situations of the other negoti12 2
ating countries.

As previously mentioned, a lack of sufficient negotiation by
the United States with those South-East Asian countries, although such an omission had constituted unjustified discrimination, may not result in a ruling that the provisionally justified
import ban on shrimp products must be lifted. 123 Nevertheless,
it remains a continuing obligation for the United States to make
serious good faith efforts in the negotiation of an agreement.
Although the United States would be provisionally entitled to
implement the measure, namely the trade restriction, 124 the
Panel's ruling was inclined to condition the eventual justification of maintaining the import prohibition on the satisfaction of
making ongoing serious good faith efforts to reach a multilateral
agreement. 125 Moreover, the Panel concluded that the ongoing
obligation may be subject to further control under Article 21.5 of
the DSU.126 This suggests that if efforts at negotiation cease,
any complaining party may have further recourse to Article 21.5
of the DSU for examination of the legitimacy of the trade ban.
Such an approach may enhance a country's obligation to engage
in international negotiations so long as its national trade measures dealing with transboundary environmental problems remain in place.

122. Id. at para. 5.73 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
123. Id. at para. 5.87.
124. The United States's efforts seemed quite satisfactory to the Panel, especially considering "its active participation and its financial support to the negotiations." Id. at para. 5.84.
125. Id. at paras. 5.87, 6.1(b).
126. See Shrimp 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 8, at para. 6.2.
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CONCLUSION
As the WTO's involvement in trade-linkage issues such as
the environment and human rights becomes increasingly unavoidable and more essential, the introduction of non-typical
trade rules seems to be necessary in assisting the settlement of
disputes that involve considerations beyond pure trade norms.
Applying the Vienna Convention's rules on treaty interpretation
to the WTO agreements, there is no indication that invoking
non-trade considerations in WTO jurisprudence is impermissible.
Pursuing international cooperation and negotiations following consensual and multilateral procedures with the aim of creating an international agreement has been generally recognized
as the preferable means of addressing global environmental issues. 127 Surely, this mandate applies to the conservation and
management of natural resources, including marine life such as
sea turtles and dolphins.
With respect to the relationship between multilateral solutions and unilateral trade measures, the Appellate Body in its
original Shrimp decision found that members are required to
pursue negotiated solutions based on an international consensus
before resorting to unilateral methods in order to avoid unjustified discrimination. 128 A plain meaning interpretation of the
rulings seems to support the priority of multilateral negotiations over unilateral measures. 129 A violation might lead to the
effect that such a provisionally justified unilateral measure will
be terminated until the mandate to negotiate is fulfilled. Such a
result, perhaps, was what Malaysia expected the WTO to request the United States to do.
Irrespective of confirming the preferred status of a multilateral approach, however, the WTO judicial organs remained
reluctant to honor international solutions at the expense of unilateral ones. Rather, the WTO Panel and Appellate Body were
inclined to situate unilateral measures with international negotiations on a parallel basis. This tendency may render the term
"before" somewhat meaningless. Regrettably, in reviewing the
U.S. implementation of the original Shrimp rulings, the WTO

127. See, e.g., Shrimp AB Report, supra note 2, at paras. 154, 166, 168; see also
supra note 40 and accompanying text (listing various international instruments that
express a preference for negotiated settlements).
128. Id. at para. 166.
129. See Ni, supra note 16, at 32.

MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE

[Vol. 14:1

did not clarify the legal meaning of the word "before." As a result, it appears that any trade measure that is provisionally justified can remain in place while international negotiations are
being pursued.
The ruling seems to suggest that failure to engage in such
negotiations may be fixed by a later action. This is likely to encourage parties to resort to unilateral measures in the first
stage even though international negotiations have not yet been
pursued. Further, the WTO substantially reduced the burden of
the country that was required to seek international negotiations
by deciding that the fulfillment of such a mandate does not extend to the stage of concluding an agreement. On the other
hand, in order to urge the country to take the mandate seriously
and to appease the possible criticism that the WTO may be
ready to embrace unilateral measures at any cost, it finally decided that the previously imposed trade embargoes might be
maintained as long as serious negotiations to reach a multilateral agreement continue in good faith.
On the basis of the recent WTO decisions described in this
Article, it is probably premature to conclude that the WTO will
respect member states' unilateral environmental protection initiatives without reservation, even at the expense of blocking a
certain degree of market access. Indeed, WTO tribunals have
repeatedly emphasized the merits of a multilateral approach.
Yet according to recent WTO jurisprudence, a unilateral measure can be provisionally sustained as long as parallel international negotiations are underway. 13 0 Hence, it may be fair to assume that WTO jurisprudence seems increasingly inclined to
acknowledge that nationally-imposed trade restrictions may
serve as useful and effective leverage in protecting the global
environment. 131
The debate on the general issues of trade and the environment will not only continue, but will become more complicated
130. It is important to note that some issues regarding the eventual permissibility of a unilateral measure in the framework of multilateral solutions must be addressed. For example, de La Fayette poses the following question: "If a unilateral
measure is imposed in an emergency situation, must it be lifted once a multilateral
agreement addressing the problem has been reached or has come into force?" de La
Fayette, supra note 46, at 691; see also Ni, supra note 16, at 33 (pointing out some
unsolved issues regarding the interaction between unilateral measures and multilateral process that is honored by Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration).
131. Nevertheless, it has been observed that the Appellate Body's proenvironment stand might be changed by future legislative activities, particularly in
the new Doha round of negotiations or under the influence of WTO representatives.
See de La Fayette, supra note 46, at 691.
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in the wake of the development of new technology. As international movements of genetically modified organisms and other
products involving bio-technology arouse controversy in the
WTO system, 132 it will be interesting to observe how the institution addresses new disputes. 133 Certainly, this line of jurisprudence needs further study in order to strike a proper balance
between the preservation of trade liberalization and due regard
for national legislation that aims to fulfill public policy on protecting domestic health or environmental interests.

132. On Aug. 29, 2003, at the request of Argentina, Canada, and the United
States, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a panel to adjudicate the consistency of the EC's regulations on genetically modified food and feed traceability
with WTO rules. See http://www.law.georgetown.edu/iiel/current/gmos/index.html
(last visited Sept. 27, 2004).
133. See, e.g., Shaw & Schwartz, supra note 4, at 143-44 (discussing several
WTO agreements, including the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures and the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,
that may govern the dispute over genetically modified organisms (GMO's). The authors imply that the settlement of the dispute cannot reach a satisfactory result
without taking into account the merits of the Biosafety Protocol.); see also Joanne
Scott, European Regulations of GMOs and the WTO, 9 Colum. J. Eur. L. 213-39
(2003).
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